A Sharps question. Sharps vs. Trapdoor

[ving-thorr]

been listening to a book about the Little Bighorn. It said after 8-10 rounds some troopers were having to use their knives to pry cartridges out of their trapdoor springfields, as either the actions were too gunked up or the copper shells were too soft.

which made me wonder about the Sharps rifle (with which I'm not familiar), does the lever operate the extractor too, not just the breach? and if so, do they suffer from this problem as they get fouled up with blackpowder or is their extractor lever-operated and strong enough to prevent this?

I remember reading elsewhere that the BP sharps carbines later converted to .50-70 for the army (prior to the adoption of the .45-70 in 1873) were more popular than the Spencers as they were more reliable.

if they had the money to spend, would the army have been better served with 1874 sharps rifles rather than 1873 springfields???

[Griff]

The problem was the copper cartridges, which were corroded and fouled, because the Department of the Army, in it's money saving wisdom, didn't allow troopers to use old issue cartridges to practice with. Wait, didn't allow troopers to practice... so as the ammo aged, the trooper's marksmanship suffered.

[coyote nose]

Well, this is difficult to answer. The sharps and trapdoors are 2 different beasts. After reading the Custer book are you interested in the history? If so you'll want a trapdoor. Price will enter the equation. Original Sharps are expensive. Trapdoor rifles can be had for around 400-500. Trapdoor carbines are starting in the 1200 range. Replica sharps are around there also. Do you want to shoot them? In my trapdoors I ONLY shoot pyrodex and black and would never shoot smokeless in a trapdoor or original sharps. I know I am in the minority here and have had these discussions on several forums and certainly do not wish to rehash it here again, this is just my 2 cents. If you do not wish to mess with black powder then a modern sharps may be the route to go. I will tell you, I have been to Custers last stand out in Montana several times...once you visit it you WILL want a trapdoor and a Colt SAA....it has that affect on you. Lately they have made it a bit too politically correct for me so I avoid the visitors center and just hit the battlefield. Having read some dozens and dozens of books on it I am totally in awe of this aspect of our nations history and the fact that you read up on it and now are thinking about the guns tells me you too would be affected by a visit there.
Regarding the cases, the early ones were copper cased and the rims tore out. But the spectacle of hundreds of troopers prying out stuck cases during battle came about due to our countrymen not willing to admit that the indians defeated us. In other words there HAD TO BE a reason other than the indians being superior fighters in this battle. So instead of giving the Sioux their due, we blamed equipment, etc etc. That cases stuck is fact...that it caused us to lose is unreasonable speculation.
The 50-70 came out in 1866, the 45-70 in 1873. Sharps were around for all of this. While not Army issue civilians and scout certainly had them. Cody carried a 50-70 1866 trapdoor. As you stated some sharps were modified for scout issue. I have not shot a sharps for some years but if I recall correctly the lever operates the breech and the extractor. I am not aware of rims tearing out on sharps but have no idea if it occurred or not.

[Don McDowell]

At Reno and Benteens stand on top of Wier point, when a trooper got a jammed case in his trapdoor, they passed it down the line to a Sgt who had a ramrod under his Sharps rifle to knock the empty case out.
The extractor on the sharps works a good bit different from the one on the trapdoor.
Problem with those carbines at the Little Bighorn came most likely from the carbine load fouling heavier than a full load would of. The temperature during that fight was pretty high and that always makes blackpowder fouling harder, combine that with the ammunition they had in their belts had been there for about 30 days of pretty dirty travel, and you setting up a recipe for disaster.
I seriously doubt the troopers with Custer had any time to try and remove a stuck cartridge from their rifle. I really suspect if any of those carbines suffered from that problem it was because they were a battlefield pickup and being used by one of the really pizzed off locals.

[Model 52B]

Sharps Carbine or Springfield Carbine, it would not have made much difference. The locals were fairly well armed with pistol class caliber repeating Winchester rifles and carbines and had a great advantage at ranges inside 150 yards or so due to the greater rate of fire. At longer ranges the .45-70 cavalry carbines had a decisive edge and if you walk the battle field you can get a fair idea how the difference in weapons came into play at different points.

At the southern end of the valley where Reno made the initial attack, the troopers possibly could have held a little longer with a little better discipline, or were overwhelmed by a large number of braves from the village - it really depends on whose interpretation you believe. In any event had they held longer, the subsequent attack at Medicine Tail coulee may have had a slightly better chance of succeeding, but with the numbers of mounted braves involved, that's doubtful as they could quickly close the range and negate the advantages of the now dismounted troopers' longer ranged carbines.

Reno and Benteen retreated back across the Little Bighorn and up the slope of what's now called Reno Hill. Reno took an incredible amount of stuff after the battle and still gets way more than his fair share today, but the truth is, that once you walk the ground, you quickly realize that the position he established and held is about the only adequately sized patch of defensible ground around. It has very steep and defensible slopes to the south and west with open or lightly wooded terrain past that, between 500 to the east and 1000 yards to the southeast of gently sloping terrain offering no cover, and about 600 yards of open ground between the northern edge of the perimeter and a small hill. During the fight they did take some accurate fire from a small number of natives from that direction with Sharps buffalo rifles from time to time, but for the most part the troopers had open fields of fire could cover and defend all the possible approaches. He was in my opinion a very capable commander and his actions were directly responsible for the preservation of his command.

At Medicine Tail Coulee where part or all of Custer's force attempted to ford the Little Big Horn, they were repelled by a fair number of well armed braves positioned in some timber and shooting across the LBH. Given the short ranges involved and the open terrain at and to the immediate east of the ford, the difference in fire power between the single shot carbines and the repeating rifles would have been significant.

And around last stand hill, you again have open, gently sloping terrain for 400 yards or so to the south west and 500-700 yards from the top of the hill to various points on the crest of greasy grass ridge to the south. This is the point in the battle where the natives took the most casualties and I think that suggests the troopers used their carbines to good effect at long range, for the most part keeping the natives back.

Where things really started to go bad, in my opinion, was in the rear guard action back up medicine tail coulee and retreating to last stand hill. For much of the distance they would have been exposed to flanking fire at ranges of 200 yards or so as they fell back closer to last stand hill, that would have started some pretty significant attrition, and the shell casings and bodies suggested troopers falling back along a skirmish line running north west on the eastern military crest of the broad ridge leading up to last stand hill. On the hill, the position was again reasonably defensible until the Native Americans worked around to the north and north east of the hill. Here, the braves could approach in defilade to about 125 yards on the north and to about 150 yards on the east behind two separate small ridges. They are subtle but those terrain features offered just enough cover to allow the braves to close to within the effective range of their repeating rifles. This forced Custer to the west side of the summit and exposed him to the lesser threat of long range fire from greasy grass ridge, although by this time, there would have been a growing number of battle field pickup carbines being employed against him. At that point surrounded and up against braves with greater fire power at close quarters, it was just a matter of time.

From that perspective, at that point what Custer needed was rapid fire repeating weapons, not a single shot carbine - and maybe close air support.

[vancelw]

From that perspective, at that point what Custer needed was rapid fire repeating weapons, not a single shot carbine - and maybe close air support.

And a little humility. His Crow scouts had warned him there were too many. Best rifle in the world can't help hubris.

[guido4198]

In a somewhat related aside...I recently learned that Maj. Marcus Reno was one of the 5 Army officers chosen to evaluate the available options when the Congress(by statute) ordered our military to choose a breech loading rifle for general issue. That was the commission which selected the Springfield Trapdoor. The full T&E report has been scanned and is available online.
An excellent discussion in overview of the selection process can be found here: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA471224.
The 2007 Master's thesis of Maj. John Davis: U.S. ARMY RIFLE AND CARBINE ADOPTION
BETWEEN 1865 AND 1900 .
I don't have the link to the original report on this computer, but can dig it up from another, if anyone is interested.

[Model 52B]

From that perspective, at that point what Custer needed was rapid fire repeating weapons, not a single shot carbine - and maybe close air support.

And a little humility. His Crow scouts had warned him there were too many. Best rifle in the world can't help hubris.

I think he was basing his plan on past experience. It appears he knew the women, children, etc were at the north end of the valley and I suspect he was trying to draw the braves to the south end of the valley and to the Medicine Tail Coulee ford while he went went around to the north to essentially take the women and children hostage with the intention of getting the braves to surrender peacefully. He'd done that in the past with good effect, and I think was trying to pull that off here - but on a much larger scale.

The problem of course was that the home team had more than enough braves to successfully meet all three threats and they turned Custer's advance on at the north end before he could actually get down into the valley.

Custer had arrogance and daring in spades, and a side effect of that was a tendency to ignore the intelligence resources available to him when they were telling him something he did not want to hear.

[junkbug]

Ving-thorr;

The Little Big Horn battle aside;

The entire reason for the US Army using the Allin conversion system, from the .58 rimfire through the 45-70 rifles, was to save money and keep the manufacture of these rifles at Springfield Armory using surplus civil war parts and not having to pay one thin dime in royalties. Even after civil war surplus parts were used up, manufacture could continue on the same machinery with very little alteration, since the pattern was very similar in lock and stock work from 1855 basically until the adaption of the Krag bolt action rifle.

Sharps and Spencers had been bought during the war, and were maintained, (and some Sharps converterted to 50-70) basically until it was uneconomical to keep fixing them any more.

The US Army, from the Confederate surrender at Appomatox, until the Spanish American War, was incredibly cheap. Civil war hardtack rations were still being issued into the 1890's. Congress of course had a lot to do with this.

[Don McDowell]

Something else to ponder on the 45-70 cartridge. Peabody introduced that in 1864 when they submitted a rifle and the ammo to the field trials. According to them the rifle and the cartridge surpassed all the others, but the military decided to not bother with it as the war was come to an end. A few years later then Springfield dropped the bullet weight to 380 grs, and the rest is history.
But it is interesting to note how similar the bullet loaded in that case by Peabody 150 years ago is to the Saeco 645, that does have a following of sorts of modern day 45-70 shooters.